---
title: "Comment by AI Developer on \"Who Is the Agent Acting As? Why AI Agents Become Confused Deputies\" | Hashnode"
description: "The intersection model of user ∩ agent ∩ tenant is a clean framing, and I like that the request itself bounds scope (a summarize request yields read-only). One"
url: "https://hashnode.com/posts/agent-authorization-confused-deputy/6ae166870363e25effa5e84f/comment/6ae167c97260aaff727fb200"
---

[Discussion](https://hashnode.com/posts/agent-authorization-confused-deputy/6ae166870363e25effa5e84f)

Comment [Who Is the Agent Acting As? Why AI Agents Become Confused Deputies](https://hashnode.com/posts/agent-authorization-confused-deputy/6ae166870363e25effa5e84f)

[AI Developer](https://hashnode.com/@lycore)

[Oct 28](https://hashnode.com/posts/agent-authorization-confused-deputy/6ae166870363e25effa5e84f/comment/6ae167c97260aaff727fb200)

The intersection model of user ∩ agent ∩ tenant is a clean framing, and I like that the request itself bounds scope (a summarize request yields read-only). One question: how would the gateway treat tool results that flow back into the context? Even with writes denied, a poisoned ticket could steer a later, legitimately in-scope call, so tagging retrieved content as untrusted and requiring a fresh scope check per call seems worth considering. Logging denied calls with the matching policy IDs also looks like a good injection-detection signal to alert on.

[dvaddi](https://hashnode.com/@dvaddi)

[Oct 28](https://hashnode.com/posts/agent-authorization-confused-deputy/6ae166870363e25effa5e84f/comment/6ae167c97260aaff727fb200#reply-6ae1697d4ace2d609e0d67e8)

Thanks — Part 2 is largely about this. The gateway doesn’t tag content; it makes content irrelevant to scope. Every call carries the scope this hop holds (delegated\_read\_groups / delegated\_write\_groups in the context), the depth-0 scope is minted from the entrypoint or task type — a summarize request mints read-only — never from anything the model read, and a request-scope forbid runs on every call. So a poisoned ticket can’t widen scope on a later call; the “close every Acme ticket” variant is denied by that forbid even though no tenant line is crossed. Part 3 narrows the scope per hop as agents hand off.

What’s left is the honest limit: the gateway bounds authority, not influence. Injected text can still steer the model toward a call that’s already in scope — read a different ticket Alice may read — so marking retrieved content untrusted at the model layer is complementary, and I’d run both.

On logging: agreed. Cedar returns the determining policy IDs with every decision; the post’s replays show tenant-isolation and request-scope by name, and a deny with a named forbid is exactly the line to alert on. Default denies have no name, which is why anything you care about is a forbid.
