---
title: "Comment by Elarigent on \"Who Is the Agent Acting As? Why AI Agents Become Confused Deputies\" | Hashnode"
description: "The Alice and Globex example makes the intersection picture concrete. Each set added can only shrink what a call may do, and a check in code the model cannot re"
url: "https://hashnode.com/posts/agent-authorization-confused-deputy/6ae166870363e25effa5e84f/comment/6ae46b2a53d48cf489d8497d"
---

[Discussion](https://hashnode.com/posts/agent-authorization-confused-deputy/6ae166870363e25effa5e84f)

Comment [Who Is the Agent Acting As? Why AI Agents Become Confused Deputies](https://hashnode.com/posts/agent-authorization-confused-deputy/6ae166870363e25effa5e84f)

[Elarigent](https://hashnode.com/@enterpriseaiagents)

[Oct 30](https://hashnode.com/posts/agent-authorization-confused-deputy/6ae166870363e25effa5e84f/comment/6ae46b2a53d48cf489d8497d)

The Alice and Globex example makes the intersection picture concrete. Each set added can only shrink what a call may do, and a check in code the model cannot reach is a boundary, not a suggestion buried in a prompt.

[dvaddi](https://hashnode.com/@dvaddi)

[Nov 1](https://hashnode.com/posts/agent-authorization-confused-deputy/6ae166870363e25effa5e84f/comment/6ae46b2a53d48cf489d8497d#reply-6ae788bad081b95454f05bb0)

Glad the Alice/Globex example landed that was the hardest part to make concrete. The “boundary, not a suggestion” framing is the whole point: anything the model can read, it can be talked out of, so the only sets that count are the ones enforced in code it never sees. Part 2 takes the intersection and puts tests and a mutation run behind it, so each guard has to prove it earns its keep.
