---
title: "Discussion on \"How a \"Fixed\" IDOR and an Empty String Led to 5 Million+ File Leaks\" | Hashnode"
description: "Discussion on \"How a \"Fixed\" IDOR and an Empty String Led to 5 Million+ File Leaks\". When I start looking at a target in finance, medical, etc, I always go for the most valuable data. In this case, on a major application we'll call \"Redacted Corp,\" that meant file uploads. Invoices, personal documents, signatures... all the PII.\nPart..."
url: "https://hashnode.com/posts/how-a-fixed-idor-and-an-empty-string-led-to-5-million-file-leaks/6901f0e5c07f42d6dd6cdf6d"
---

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# [How a "Fixed" IDOR and an Empty String Led to 5 Million+ File Leaks](https://hackt.us/how-a-fixed-idor-and-an-empty-string-led-to-5-million-file-leaks?utm_source=hashnode&utm_medium=feed)

When I start looking at a target in finance, medical, etc, I always go for the most valuable data. In this case, on a major application we'll call "Redacted Corp," that meant file uploads. Invoices, personal documents, signatures... all the PII. Part...

Oct 29, 2025 · 6 min read · hackt.us  
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## Written by

[Hacktus](https://hashnode.com/@Hacktus)

@Hacktus

  
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I hunt for bugs and cacti sometimes :)

Hey! I'm a 24-year-old security researcher.

## Responses 1

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[0xMountain](https://hashnode.com/@0xmountain)

[Nov 21, 2025](https://hashnode.com/posts/how-a-fixed-idor-and-an-empty-string-led-to-5-million-file-leaks/6901f0e5c07f42d6dd6cdf6d/comment/6920651fd5c0f50d69deb509)

Fantastic article...

I have a specific question regarding the chaining of the flaws in Part 4.

In Part 1, you successfully confirmed the IDOR using GET /api/v1/files/view/{file\_id}, which directly downloaded the file content. However, in Part 4, after successfully leaking the file keys, you returned to the POST /api/v2/user/documents endpoint to obtain the pre-signed S3 download URL instead of using the original GET endpoint.

I'm curious if you attempted the direct GET download with the leaked keys and if there was a specific reason to focus entirely on the POST endpoint for the final download step.
