---
title: "Discussion on \"How Banks and Netflix Stop Bots Trying Millions of Stolen Passwords: Credential Stuffing, Made Simple\" | Hashnode"
description: "Discussion on \"How Banks and Netflix Stop Bots Trying Millions of Stolen Passwords: Credential Stuffing, Made Simple\". By Devang Pandya · Cloud Tech by Devang · Cloud • DevOps • AI — Made Simple\n\nThis post is the full breakdown for the Bapu ki Class Reel on credential stuffing. If you came here after commenting BOTS,"
url: "https://hashnode.com/posts/how-banks-and-netflix-stop-bots-trying-millions-of-stolen-passwords-credential-stuffing-made-simple/6adcbd17770359afdcc93e53"
---

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Discussion

# [How Banks and Netflix Stop Bots Trying Millions of Stolen Passwords: Credential Stuffing, Made Simple](https://cloudtechbydevang.com/how-banks-and-netflix-stop-bots-trying-millions-of-stolen-passwords-credential-stuffing-made-simple?utm_source=hashnode&utm_medium=feed)

By Devang Pandya · Cloud Tech by Devang · Cloud • DevOps • AI — Made Simple This post is the full breakdown for the Bapu ki Class Reel on credential stuffing. If you came here after commenting BOTS,

Oct 24 · 9 min read · cloudtechbydevang.com  
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-   [#cybersecurity](https://hashnode.com/tag/cybersecurity)
-   [#credential-stuffing](https://hashnode.com/tag/credential-stuffing)
-   [#mfa](https://hashnode.com/tag/mfa)
-   [#owasp](https://hashnode.com/tag/owasp)
-   [#web-security](https://hashnode.com/tag/web-security)

## Written by

[Devang Pandya](https://hashnode.com/@cloudtechbydevang)

@cloudtechbydevang · Pune, India

  
[View profile](https://hashnode.com/@cloudtechbydevang)

Cloud | DevOps | AI made simple · 14+ yrs on AWS, GCP & Kubernetes

I help engineers learn cloud, DevOps, SRE and AI in simple English, crack interviews and follow clear roadmaps. 14+ years building and running platforms on AWS, GCP, Kubernetes and Terraform. One topic a day.

## Responses 1

Markdown supported · ⌘↵ to post

[Furqan Ashraf](https://hashnode.com/@jfreaks)

[6d ago](https://hashnode.com/posts/how-banks-and-netflix-stop-bots-trying-millions-of-stolen-passwords-credential-stuffing-made-simple/6adcbd17770359afdcc93e53/comment/6af5816fffb235a509d842fe)

Section 3 is the part I'd expand in an interview answer, because "use IP as one signal" invites the follow-up "which signal, exactly?"

Three that carry their weight:

1.  **Network type.** Hosting/cloud ASNs on a consumer login page are unusual. Cheap to check, catches the lazier attacks.
2.  **Anonymizer flags.** VPN exits, Tor, residential proxy pools. Residential proxies are the hard case you mention, since they look like home users, so this needs a source that tracks proxy networks, not just ASN owners.
3.  **Distance from the account's history.** A login from a country the account has never used, through a VPN, is a much stronger reason for step-up MFA than either fact alone.

None of these should block on their own. They feed the risk engine in your step 5 and decide between "allow" and "ask for MFA".

On the per-range limits in Layer 2: for IPv6, key on the /64 rather than the full address, otherwise one host can rotate through billions of addresses for free.

(Disclosure: I work on [IPGeolocation.io](https://ipgeolocation.io/documentation/ip-security-api.html), which provides the flags in point 2. Other providers do too; the design works with any of them.)
