---
title: "Comment by Jailson Shankle on \"Preventing Denial of Service Attacks in Smart Contracts: Implementing the Withdrawal Pattern\" | Hashnode"
description: "I once deployed a staking contract where a single malicious user griefed the withdrawal function by front-running with a tiny, failing receive() call. Spent two"
url: "https://hashnode.com/posts/preventing-denial-of-service-attacks-in-smart-contracts-implementing-the-withdrawal-pattern/67dd7bb9cf09a070e54cd8e9/comment/69f89fc63a161c24bd52cf44"
---

[Discussion](https://hashnode.com/posts/preventing-denial-of-service-attacks-in-smart-contracts-implementing-the-withdrawal-pattern/67dd7bb9cf09a070e54cd8e9)

Comment [Preventing Denial of Service Attacks in Smart Contracts: Implementing the Withdrawal Pattern](https://hashnode.com/posts/preventing-denial-of-service-attacks-in-smart-contracts-implementing-the-withdrawal-pattern/67dd7bb9cf09a070e54cd8e9)

[Jailson Shankle](https://hashnode.com/@shankle)

[May 4](https://hashnode.com/posts/preventing-denial-of-service-attacks-in-smart-contracts-implementing-the-withdrawal-pattern/67dd7bb9cf09a070e54cd8e9/comment/69f89fc63a161c24bd52cf44)

I once deployed a staking contract where a single malicious user griefed the withdrawal function by front-running with a tiny, failing `receive()` call. Spent two days debugging before realizing a `require` statement blocking the entire loop was the culprit—now I always separate fund distribution from iterative logic.
