---
title: "Comment by Mihai_LeanZero on \"Rate Limiting Isn't One Layer: What LogicVisor and Titan Actually Do Differently\" | Hashnode"
description: "The thing I'd flag from running Redis-backed throttling in production: what happens when Redis itself blips matters as much as the ttl/limit numbers. A global A"
url: "https://hashnode.com/posts/rate-limiting-isn-t-one-layer-what-logicvisor-and-titan-actually-do-differently/6aae35f9d71a84eedffdf133/comment/6aaf953b8a4bfaa23dd8ec14"
---

[Discussion](https://hashnode.com/posts/rate-limiting-isn-t-one-layer-what-logicvisor-and-titan-actually-do-differently/6aae35f9d71a84eedffdf133)

Comment [Rate Limiting Isn't One Layer: What LogicVisor and Titan Actually Do Differently](https://hashnode.com/posts/rate-limiting-isn-t-one-layer-what-logicvisor-and-titan-actually-do-differently/6aae35f9d71a84eedffdf133)

[Mihai\_LeanZero](https://hashnode.com/@mihaileanzero)

[Sep 20](https://hashnode.com/posts/rate-limiting-isn-t-one-layer-what-logicvisor-and-titan-actually-do-differently/6aae35f9d71a84eedffdf133/comment/6aaf953b8a4bfaa23dd8ec14)

The thing I'd flag from running Redis-backed throttling in production: what happens when Redis itself blips matters as much as the ttl/limit numbers. A global APP\_GUARD throttle that fails closed on a Redis hiccup turns a two-second cache blip into "nobody can log in," which is a worse outage than the abuse it's meant to stop. Fail-open at the global layer and reserve fail-closed for the specific routes where you'd rather reject than risk letting something through unmetered. The other one worth rehearsing on Titan specifically: legitimate retries from an upstream payment webhook don't back off politely on a 429 the way a browser does, so the exact moment you're mid-incident and getting hammered by real retries is also the moment a flat global limit is most likely to start eating legitimate traffic.

[David Essien](https://hashnode.com/@davidessien)

[Sep 20](https://hashnode.com/posts/rate-limiting-isn-t-one-layer-what-logicvisor-and-titan-actually-do-differently/6aae35f9d71a84eedffdf133/comment/6aaf953b8a4bfaa23dd8ec14#reply-6aaff4730b8d17aa01c14180)

Fair, a single global guard shouldn't carry one blanket failure policy, defaulting open, with fail-closed reserved for the specific routes where sensitive operations are carried out. Login endpoint will also fail open.

Good callout on webhook retries too, I hadn't separated that from general traffic. A flat limit treating a legitimate retry storm the same as abuse, exactly when you'd want the opposite, is a real gap. Worth handling on its own rather than folding it into the same limit. Fixing both.

Thank you for your input.
