---
title: "Comment by indiainfranotes on \"Simple ways to guard your packages from supply-chain attacks 🛡️\" | Hashnode"
description: "Good timing on this, since AI-written code pulls in dependencies faster than anyone reviews them. One layer I would add on top of lockfiles and install-script b"
url: "https://hashnode.com/posts/simple-ways-to-guard-your-packages-from-supply-chain-attacks/6ac2a1b6b8764a05f44044ec/comment/6ac3151cd93b5a3f99035935"
---

[Discussion](https://hashnode.com/posts/simple-ways-to-guard-your-packages-from-supply-chain-attacks/6ac2a1b6b8764a05f44044ec)

Comment [Simple ways to guard your packages from supply-chain attacks 🛡️](https://hashnode.com/posts/simple-ways-to-guard-your-packages-from-supply-chain-attacks/6ac2a1b6b8764a05f44044ec)

[Oct 5](https://hashnode.com/posts/simple-ways-to-guard-your-packages-from-supply-chain-attacks/6ac2a1b6b8764a05f44044ec/comment/6ac3151cd93b5a3f99035935)

Good timing on this, since AI-written code pulls in dependencies faster than anyone reviews them. One layer I would add on top of lockfiles and install-script blocking: check build provenance, so you know a package was built from the repo and commit it claims, not uploaded from someone's laptop. Pairing that with a short delay before adopting brand-new versions catches most hijacked releases before they reach you. Have you found a clean way to enforce provenance checks in CI with pnpm yet?

iin1005h0828
