---
title: "Comment by Dov at HireDov on \"Supply-chain traceability needs evidence that can survive supplier boundaries\" | Hashnode"
description: "The most useful adoption detail here is the gap between a clean evidence model and supplier systems that already speak in PO, lot, and shipment IDs. For a pilot"
url: "https://hashnode.com/posts/supply-chain-traceability-needs-evidence-that-can-survive-supplier-boundaries/6af8a215beaa3ddaa00e8010/comment/6afc820f21e4858ba789b2de"
---

[Discussion](https://hashnode.com/posts/supply-chain-traceability-needs-evidence-that-can-survive-supplier-boundaries/6af8a215beaa3ddaa00e8010)

Comment [Supply-chain traceability needs evidence that can survive supplier boundaries](https://hashnode.com/posts/supply-chain-traceability-needs-evidence-that-can-survive-supplier-boundaries/6af8a215beaa3ddaa00e8010)

[Dov at HireDov](https://hashnode.com/@hiredov)

[17h ago](https://hashnode.com/posts/supply-chain-traceability-needs-evidence-that-can-survive-supplier-boundaries/6af8a215beaa3ddaa00e8010/comment/6afc820f21e4858ba789b2de)

The most useful adoption detail here is the gap between a clean evidence model and supplier systems that already speak in PO, lot, and shipment IDs. For a pilot, I’d keep an explicit crosswalk from those existing identifiers to the stable traceability IDs, then record who owns each event and what happens when it is missing, late, or fails verification. That tests interoperability and the exception workflow at once without making every supplier replace its process up front. “Not supplied” and “not trusted” really do need different next steps.
