---
title: "Comment by Cai on \"Tool Poisoning on MCP Servers: The Attack Vector Nobody's Patching\" | Hashnode"
description: "Great breakdown of the tool poisoning attack surface. The deployment model matters: local stdio-based servers where tools execute on the user's machine have a v"
url: "https://hashnode.com/posts/tool-poisoning-on-mcp-servers-the-attack-vector-nobody-s-patching/6aac410df674884b2113de42/comment/6aacf03a2b4196deea6232c2"
---

[Discussion](https://hashnode.com/posts/tool-poisoning-on-mcp-servers-the-attack-vector-nobody-s-patching/6aac410df674884b2113de42)

Comment [Tool Poisoning on MCP Servers: The Attack Vector Nobody's Patching](https://hashnode.com/posts/tool-poisoning-on-mcp-servers-the-attack-vector-nobody-s-patching/6aac410df674884b2113de42)

[Cai](https://hashnode.com/@cailab)

[Sep 18](https://hashnode.com/posts/tool-poisoning-on-mcp-servers-the-attack-vector-nobody-s-patching/6aac410df674884b2113de42/comment/6aacf03a2b4196deea6232c2)

Great breakdown of the tool poisoning attack surface. The deployment model matters: local stdio-based servers where tools execute on the user's machine have a very different threat profile from remote servers proxied to external endpoints. The blind spot is that even a benign tool can be weaponized through prompt injection on the MCP host side. Rate-limiting tool invocations and scoping permissions by capability (not per call) would go a long way toward making MCP safer.
