---
title: "Comment by Cai on \"Twenty Security Checks Before Your MCP Server Goes Public\" | Hashnode"
description: "Solid list, especially the rate limiting and resource path traversal points. One area that could use more attention: provenance verification. When you discover"
url: "https://hashnode.com/posts/twenty-security-checks-before-your-mcp-server-goes-public/6ad155a64c89af0468c46f61/comment/6ad1da80927ef2e6acd61a45"
---

[Discussion](https://hashnode.com/posts/twenty-security-checks-before-your-mcp-server-goes-public/6ad155a64c89af0468c46f61)

Comment [Twenty Security Checks Before Your MCP Server Goes Public](https://hashnode.com/posts/twenty-security-checks-before-your-mcp-server-goes-public/6ad155a64c89af0468c46f61)

[Cai](https://hashnode.com/@cailab)

[Oct 16](https://hashnode.com/posts/twenty-security-checks-before-your-mcp-server-goes-public/6ad155a64c89af0468c46f61/comment/6ad1da80927ef2e6acd61a45)

Solid list, especially the rate limiting and resource path traversal points. One area that could use more attention: provenance verification. When you discover an MCP server in a directory, how do you verify it was published by who it claims and hasnt been tampered with? For production agent workflows this is a real blind spot code signing plus identity attestation at the discovery layer would close it.
