You’ve pointed out the exact architectural vulnerability that defines this transition, and I couldn't agree more. The concept of "human friction as an implicit control" is a brilliant way to put it. We used to secure APIs under the assumption that a human is physically limited by time, attention, and intent. When an agent bypasses that friction and calls an endpoint 500x/hour using a copied session cookie, traditional rate-limiting and WAFs are essentially blind to whether that traffic is malicious or just highly efficient. You are completely spot on about "scoped delegation." Copying the full session is an absolute security nightmare. While MCP is making great strides at the tool definition level, bridging the gap between MCP tool-calls and web auth layers (OAuth/cookies) remains a massive engineering hurdle. This exact "permission surface" challenge is what we are trying to map with the Agent Readiness Score (ARS). We believe a system cannot be truly "agent-ready" unless it can deterministically isolate the agent's actions, scope its delegation, and sanitize incoming dynamic data at runtime to prevent intent-hijacking (prompt injection). Since you are building MCP-native data tools on Apify, how are you currently tackling this session isolation boundary? Are you creating sandboxed micro-sessions for each agent run, or relying on ephemeral API keys? I'd love to learn from your approach.
