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Filtering tools/list through the same decision means Alice's assistant never even sees tickets.globex, so a call naming it most likely came from text the model read, like that line in ticket #4521. I'd put calls to tools the agent was never shown on their own alert line, separate from the tenant-isolation deny. Do you log those separately today?
The intersection model of user ∩ agent ∩ tenant is a clean framing, and I like that the request itself bounds scope (a summarize request yields read-only). One question: how would the gateway treat tool results that flow back into the context? Even with writes denied, a poisoned ticket could steer a later, legitimately in-scope call, so tagging retrieved content as untrusted and requiring a fresh scope check per call seems worth considering. Logging denied calls with the matching policy IDs also looks like a good injection-detection signal to alert on.
Elarigent
The Alice and Globex example makes the intersection picture concrete. Each set added can only shrink what a call may do, and a check in code the model cannot reach is a boundary, not a suggestion buried in a prompt.