This is a genuinely well-built design, especially the point about production credentials staying unavailable to an unauthorized path even when a hook coordinates the decision - that's the part most agent-permission writeups skip entirely. One gap I don't see addressed: what happens when two independently valid ASK approvals target the same underlying resource within their expiry window - say two on-call engineers approve two different production migrations to the same billing table a few minutes apart, each action individually well-formed and each approval correctly bound to its own action hash. Binding approval to "the exact operation that was evaluated" stops a bait-and-switch on a single pending request, but it doesn't stop two correctly-approved operations from racing each other at execution time. Drawing on our own approval-gated deploy work, that usually ends up needing a resource-scoped lock the executor takes before running any approved action, on top of the action-identity check, so a second approved action against a still-locked resource gets requeued rather than executed. Is that layer intentionally out of scope here, or would you fold it into the execution layer's contract too?