Coming at this from your own red-team angle: the moment you describe as "You start wondering whether you're supervising the computer or whether the computer has quietly promoted itself" is exactly where approval fatigue becomes the vulnerability. Watching windows flash by at machine speed, would you have noticed one malicious action in the flurry? Nobody would, which means the real security boundary is whatever was granted before the run: which directories, which network access, which tools. That boundary is also where the ecosystem is weakest, since agents increasingly load third-party skills and extensions that broaden it silently. Our August 2026 census aggregated every published security audit of agent skills, and the five auditors disagree on 12.7% of the listings more than one of them rated, with fail counts running from 697 listings to zero: skillselion.com/research/agent-skill-security-cen… (disclosure: I run Skillselion). Would genuinely read a follow-up where you red-team this setup.