The number I'd watch most in the case study is 60 of 97 benign AgentDojo tasks held for approval, next to 25 of 26 attacks. In the replay, about 3 in 10 holds are attacks. In production, where attacks are rare, almost every hold a reviewer sees will be benign, and a queue like that teaches people to click approve. Once that habit sets in, REQUIRE_APPROVAL protects about as much as ALLOW, whether or not the approved flag gets authenticated.
The audit record from your guide already carries what you need to track this: tool_name, verdict and the approval fields. If you count held-then-approved per tool and per policy_version, the tools whose holds are approved nearly every time show you where an argument constraint should replace the human check. Your delete example works that way: a pattern for /workspace/tmp/ could be allowed outright, and only paths outside it would wait for a person.