The most valuable part of your framing is the developer origin - because the bypasses that automation actually finds are almost always the ones the framework made easy to leave in. Forced browsing to /admin or an unprotected API route, JWTs accepted with alg=none or a weak symmetric secret, OTP endpoints without rate limiting, password reset tokens that are sequential or never expire: none of these need creativity, they need a checklist and a loop, which is exactly why the attacker's Python script exists. The inversion I'd offer to developers reading this: the same script is a regression test. Every bypass class you automate from the red side can run in CI from the blue side - spin up the app, run the forced-browsing wordlist, try alg=none against your own JWT endpoint, hammer the OTP route and count the responses. If your pipeline tolerates it, so will the internet. And the second-order point: authentication bypasses are loud in logs only if someone logs the failures - 401s on /admin, JWT signature rejections, OTP attempt counts. Most breaches of this kind were visible for weeks; nobody was reading the counter.