I like the threat model, but I'd be careful how far the privacy claim goes. Browser-only stops network exfiltration, not a malicious extension or a shared machine reading the DOM, so "nothing leaves your browser" is true in a narrower sense than it sounds. One concrete gap: a JWT decoder that decodes without verifying the signature gives false confidence. Anyone can mint a token with admin claims and a valid-looking payload, and a decode-only view can't tell you it's forged. If you ever add optional signature verification with a pasted secret, that's the feature that would make me actually trust it for staging tokens.
You’re right on the privacy wording: “nothing leaves your browser” means we don’t upload the paste to our servers. It doesn’t protect against a malicious extension or someone with access to the machine/DOM. I’ll tighten that language so the claim stays honest.
On JWT: decode-only is intentional today, and the page already notes it doesn’t verify the signature — but I agree a decode-only view can still create false confidence if someone skim-reads. Optional local verification with a pasted secret (for staging) is a strong feature request; I’ve noted it.
Kamran Khan
Full-Stack Web Developer (React.js + Laravel) | Dashboards, SaaS Apps & Management Systems for Global Clients
I like the threat model, but I'd be careful how far the privacy claim goes. Browser-only stops network exfiltration, not a malicious extension or a shared machine reading the DOM, so "nothing leaves your browser" is true in a narrower sense than it sounds. One concrete gap: a JWT decoder that decodes without verifying the signature gives false confidence. Anyone can mint a token with admin claims and a valid-looking payload, and a decode-only view can't tell you it's forged. If you ever add optional signature verification with a pasted secret, that's the feature that would make me actually trust it for staging tokens.