Cai
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the two gates framing is right. from the other end: building grunz (coding agent on open models) we originally shipped with a handful of MCP servers switched on by default and ended up turning all of them off, because they were causing weird glitches we couldn't trace back to anything the user actually asked for. deny by default at admission would have saved us the trouble. the tool-call gate also matters more with open or abliterated models, since prompt level "don't call X" instructions are exactly what those follow less reliably. is the allowlist per project or per user in your setup?
This is a crucial distinction that often gets lost in MCP discussions. Server admission is about trust at the connection layer, whereas tool-call permission is about runtime authorization scoped to specific capabilities. One pattern that addresses this cleanly is binding tool-level grants to session keys with finite lifetimes, so each connection carries its own permission set rather than inheriting blanket access from the admission handshake. That way you admit a server once but still enforce per-invocation constraints on which tools it can actually call.