One extra failure-injection case for the deny-by-default check: run the same blocked-destination probe from each execution context an agent can launch (agent process, shell child, browser or tool worker), then verify they all hit the intended egress policy. Include run and tool identity with the destination and block decision so an alert tells an operator which run to stop. I haven’t performed this audit myself; I work on Orke at BOMTOBE, an agent workspace, so this is a test suggestion, not a claim about any setup.
Thanks, that is a good addition. The egress check in the post only proves the policy once, from the agent process; your version proves it from each place an agent can actually make a call, which is where the gap would hide. I would add one thing: run the probe on every deploy, not only in the audit, so a change to the tool worker's network settings shows up the same day. Agreed on the alert fields too: run id, tool id, destination and decision, or the operator cannot tell which run to stop.
BomToBe
BOMTOBE makes orke, a desktop workspace for Claude Code and Codex.
One extra failure-injection case for the deny-by-default check: run the same blocked-destination probe from each execution context an agent can launch (agent process, shell child, browser or tool worker), then verify they all hit the intended egress policy. Include run and tool identity with the destination and block decision so an alert tells an operator which run to stop. I haven’t performed this audit myself; I work on Orke at BOMTOBE, an agent workspace, so this is a test suggestion, not a claim about any setup.