Interesting angle — and honestly, this is one of those topics where the gap between narrative and reality is huge.
From a dev perspective, the key misunderstanding is when Bitcoin is actually vulnerable. As you pointed out, quantum attacks target exposed public keys, not dormant addresses. That alone removes a massive portion of the “instant collapse” scenario people imagine.
The more realistic model is gradual risk emergence:
First, experimental quantum advantage Then niche cryptographic breaks Only much later, large-scale ECDSA threats
That timeline gives plenty of room for migration. Bitcoin already has a precedent for evolving its cryptography layer (P2PK → P2PKH → SegWit → Taproot). Moving toward PQC (like ML-DSA or similar NIST candidates) would follow the same pattern — phased, opt-in, then widely adopted.
Also, people underestimate coordination incentives. If quantum risk becomes real, everyone (exchanges, wallets, institutions) has the same incentive to upgrade fast. It wouldn’t be a passive event.
The real challenge isn’t “can Bitcoin upgrade?” — it’s:
Backward compatibility UTXO migration (especially lost coins) Fee pressure during mass movement
So yeah, not trivial — but very solvable. Definitely not a sudden “end of crypto” moment, more like a long transition window with clear signals along the way.