Tool Poisoning on MCP Servers: The Attack Vector Nobody's Patching
The MCP (Model Context Protocol) ecosystem grew from a specification into production infrastructure faster than most teams can spell "threat model." And that speed left a gap: the layer where an agent
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Cai
A custodial email, a stablecoin wallet, a credential vault, and an agent-ready API — all at one @cai.com address.
Great breakdown of the tool poisoning attack surface. The deployment model matters: local stdio-based servers where tools execute on the user's machine have a very different threat profile from remote servers proxied to external endpoints. The blind spot is that even a benign tool can be weaponized through prompt injection on the MCP host side. Rate-limiting tool invocations and scoping permissions by capability (not per call) would go a long way toward making MCP safer.