ahmed younis

Strong point. We agree that the enforcement boundary has to move below the prompt layer. Model instructions are mutable context; they should not be the final authority mechanism. For consequential actions, our architectural direction is an external deterministic authorization layer with narrowly scoped credentials or capabilities, so compromised reasoning cannot expand execution rights. I’d make one distinction on persistence: Persistent identity should not imply persistent authority. A durable agent identity can survive restarts and be re-associated with an authoritative delegation or policy record. But the resulting authority should remain scoped, expiring, independently revocable, and auditable. On restart, the system should reconstruct current authority from trusted external state rather than inherit ambient privilege from previous model context. Persistent identity, without persistent ambient privilege.

Thanks Kartik — our design principle is that the consequential authority boundary should sit outside the agent. The agent may reason about and request an action, but it should not be able to authorize itself. For consequential operations, we prefer deterministic policy enforcement, narrowly scoped credentials/capabilities, and explicit approval gates at the tool or execution boundary. The prompt can describe intended behavior, but it should never be the security boundary. That separation becomes especially important with MCP and other externally supplied tool surfaces, where tool capability and execution authority must remain independently constrained.