DDipen Shah4d ago · 8 min readThe Fortress of Geography: How Spatial Networks and 2D Grids Shield Cooperation from ParasitesOpening question In Episodes 1 through 4, our computational society operated under a fundamental assumption: The well-mixed soup. Every agent was assumed to have an equal probability of bumping into atechecho.hashnode.dev
NNick One-DropOct 7 · 3 min readMulti-agent cooperation through in-context co-player inference (2026)This paper takes a decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning approach. What does that mean here? For context, let’s look at another DeepMind paper with overlapping authors: Multi-agent cooperatnickonedrop.hashnode.dev
DDipen ShahOct 4 · 12 min readSimulating Natural Selection: Why Unconditional Kindness Dies, and How Clusters of Trust Conquer the WorldOpening question In Episodes 1 through 3, our computational tournaments operated under a fixed social contract: The population was static. The experimenter handpicked the participants, and every archetechecho.hashnode.dev
DDipen ShahSep 27 · 12 min readSimulating Noise and Forgiveness: Why Pure Reciprocity Collapses When Communication BreaksOpening question In Episodes 1 and 2, we proved that reciprocal trust can survive against raw exploitation and build an interconnected society. Under round-robin tournament conditions, Robert Axelrod'techecho.hashnode.dev
DDipen ShahSep 20 · 5 min readBuilding a Multi-Agent Tournament Engine: Simulating Emergent Cooperation in PythonIn Episode 1: Building the Laboratory, we constructed a deterministic, isolated foundation for repeated two-agent Prisoner's Dilemma interactions. We verified that when interactions repeat, reciprocaltechecho.hashnode.dev
DDipen ShahAug 25 · 7 min readI Built a Simulation to Explore Why Selfish Agents CooperateBuilding the domain foundation for an open-source simulation of cooperation, defection, and emergent behaviour. What happens when self-interested agents interact with each other again and again? Do t1techecho.hashnode.dev
SSangharshaAug 24 · 3 min readDeceptive AI Doesn’t Break the Rules. It Optimizes Around Them: with game theoryEveryone assumes deception in AI will look obvious — a system glitch, a sudden compute spike, or a glaring anomaly. That assumption is fundamentally wrong. The most effective deception doesn’t violatenoob6t5.hashnode.dev
OOmnithiumMay 31 · 9 min readMulti-Agent Negotiation Protocols: How AI Agents Should Bargain for ResourcesStatic quotas are the death of agentic autonomy. If you're still using Kubernetes-style resource limits to manage your AI swarms, you're likely leaving 30% to 40% of your compute capacity on the tableomnithium.hashnode.dev
MMacaulay001May 11 · 7 min readI reran Axelrod's 1981 prisoner's dilemma tournament. Tit-for-tat still earns its reputation.Part 49 of Forgotten Theories, a series re-testing old scientific claims with modern tools. Find the rest under the #forgotten-theories tag. In 1980, the political scientist Robert Axelrod sent letters to game theorists, economists, psychologists, a...forgottentheorieshashnodedev.hashnode.dev
BBerkan SesenMay 11 · 16 min readQ-Learning for Games: Teaching an Agent Tic-Tac-Toe Through Self-PlayTic-tac-toe is a solved game. Any competent adult can force a draw every time. But can an agent figure that out with zero human knowledge? Give two agents a blank board, a few simple rules about wins sesenai.hashnode.dev