8h ago · 13 min read · AI coding agents like Claude Code and Codex default to autonomous execution — writing files, running shell commands, and making architectural decisions without pausing for review. Human-in-the-loop (HITL) approval gates fix this by inserting explicit...
Join discussion8h ago · 13 min read · Prompt injection attacks against AI coding agents work by embedding malicious instructions in content the agent reads during normal operation — GitHub PR comments, web search results, and third-party skill files. A single crafted string can redirect ...
Join discussion2d ago · 13 min read · AI coding agents like Claude Code, Codex, and Open Code generate code faster than any developer can review line by line — and that speed gap is where real risk lives. The practical solution isn't to review less; it's to review at the right moments. A...
Join discussion2d ago · 14 min read · Building an AI coding agent is not primarily about choosing the right model. It's about building the infrastructure around the model that keeps it safe, bounded, and trustworthy. A production agent harness contains only about 1–2% actual AI logic — t...
Join discussion2d ago · 13 min read · Running two or three AI coding agents in parallel on the same codebase is a legitimate productivity multiplier — until they silently collide. Without isolation and explicit ownership boundaries, agents overwrite each other's changes, launch conflicti...
Join discussion2d ago · 15 min read · When you hand off a multi-hour task to an AI coding agent and come back to the results, the right question isn't "did it finish?" — it's "did it stay within scope?" Agents running Claude Code, Codex,
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